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Abstract  
It has been widely documented that accountability systems, including school inspections, 
bring with them unintended side-effects. These unintended effects are often negative and 
have the potential to undo the intended positive effects. However the empirical evidence is 
limited. Through a European comparative study we have had the rare opportunity to collect 
empirical evidence and study the effects (both intended and unintended) of school inspections 
(a key system of accountability) in a systematic way, across seven countries. We present the 
findings of the unintended effects in this paper. Survey self-report responses from school 
principals in each country, with differing school inspection systems, are analysed to measure 
the prevalence of these unintended effects and to investigate the part played by pressure to do 
well in inspections. A key finding is that increasing pressure in school inspection systems is 
associated with the undesired effect of the narrowing and refocussing of the curriculum and 
instructional strategies. We also show that a proportion of school principals admit to 
misrepresenting the school in data sent to the inspectorate and show evidence for 
formalisation/proceduralisation (excessive focus on records) and ossification (fear of 
experimentation in teaching), although these factors are less related to changes in pressure. 
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Introduction 
Systems of accountability, aimed at ensuring the quality of education in schools, now exist in 
the majority of countries across Europe (Eurydice 2004) and are widespread globally. Most 
of these systems take the form of school inspectorates, but they also involve the use of 
examination results and league tables. Since the work of Smith (1995) and Fitz-Gibbon 
(1997) in the 1990s, it is now widely accepted that accountability systems bring with them 
unintended effects, such as gaming, tunnel vision and measure fixation. These unintended 
effects are often negative, and as Leeuw (2000) suggests, may be so problematic as to undo 
the intended positive effects. However the empirical evidence for the unintended effects of 
school inspections and accountability systems is limited and De Wolf and Janssens (2007) 
conclude in their overview of the literature that more quality empirical research is needed. 
We aim to help fill this gap by studying the unintended consequences of school inspection 
systems in a systematic way, by analysing various consequences across a number of different 
countries. We present self-report survey data from school principals in seven countries with 
differing inspection systems in order to examine the apparent prevalence of a number of 
unintended effects such as narrowing of the curriculum. We show how these effects vary 
across the countries and suggest that these differences are related to the degree of pressure 
associated with the various inspection regimes. We argue that the prevalence and intensity of 
the unintended consequences of school inspections increases as the pressure exerted by the 
inspection system increases. We note that inspection systems are sometimes inextricably 
linked to examination results and league tables (and where this is the case we have 
considered the unintended consequences of national testing and league tables as an integral 
part of the inspection system). 
 
The empirical data presented in this paper were collected as part of the European 
Commission’s, Lifelong Learning Project, ‘The impact of school inspection on teaching and 
learning’ (ISI-TL). The project as a whole aims to fill gaps in knowledge about the impact of 
school inspection by comparing inspectorates in seven countries (England, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Czech Republic, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland as an associate project partner). 
The study aims to identify aspects of school inspections (e.g. standards and thresholds, 
sanctions and rewards) that maximise the positive, intended effects of school inspection and 
minimise the negative, unintended effects (Ehren et al. 2013). This paper focuses on the 
survey items aimed at measuring the side effects of school inspection. 
 
Due to the varying range of inspection systems, as part of the project, conceptual models 
were produced in each country to describe the inspectorate (see for example Jones and 
Tymms 2014) and were summarised in Ehren et al. (2013). Altrichter and Kemethofer (2015) 
used a priori data from these conceptual models to categorise each country’s inspectorate 
according to how much pressure the schools and principals feel to do well in the inspection. 
England and the Netherlands were found to be high pressure inspection systems, Sweden, 
Ireland and the Czech Republic had medium pressure systems and Switzerland and Austria 
had the lowest pressure inspection systems. Evidence for this theoretical ordering was 
triangulated  using a survey item designed to capture how much pressure principals feel under 
to do well on the inspection standards. In this paper we use these data to investigate 
unintended effects of school inspections. 
 
The following research questions are addressed: 
 
1. What is the prevalence of unintended consequences of school inspections across 
seven European countries? 
 
2. What part does pressure play in precipitating these unintended consequences? 
 
 
This paper begins by presenting a theoretical framework concerning the relationship between 
pressure and accountability systems. We then summarise the literature on unintended 
consequences of school inspection and go on to briefly describe the accountability systems in 
each of the countries in our project. This is followed by a description of the method and 
survey instrument used and details of the samples. We then present limitations, threats and 
mitigation followed by the results and end with a discussion and summary of the results. 
 
 
Theoretical framework: schools responding to pressure 
It is well known that stress can be employed to improve the performance of systems and that 
there can be unintended consequences. The study of the consequences of stress has been 
extensive in the physical sciences where perhaps the most relevant finding, originating from 
the nineteenth century, is Le Châtelier’s principle (Thomsen 2000). It states that “if a stress is 
applied to a system in equilibrium it will move in such a way as to negate the effect of stress”. 
The principle is widely used in chemistry to predict the consequences of changing such 
variables as temperature and concentration but it might equally be extrapolated to the social 
sciences when systems are put under stress. The key point is that the system will seek to 
reduce the effect of stress; exactly how may not be as clear in the social world as in the test 
tube but one can predict that the system will change. 
 
Within the social world it is widely accepted that as rules and regulations are put in place to 
improve performance, things often happen which were not intended. This was termed 
‘unintended consequences’ by Merton (1936) and his heavily cited article suggested that 
these unintended consequences can be positive or negative. Within the social sciences 
Campbell’s Law, paralleling Goodhart’s Law (1975) from economics, has become well cited 
with reference to the unintended effects of educational accountability:  
 
The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort 
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor. 
Campbell (1976, 49) 
 
These negative unintended consequences have been documented by Smith (1995) who 
outlined a series of ways in which groups within a system might behave in order to improve 
their indicators when put under stress. None of the actions were intended to improve 
performance but rather to give the appearance of improved performance. Fitz-Gibbon (1997) 
outlined how Smith’s ideas could be applied to schools when put under pressure. De Wolf 
and Janssens (2007) extend these ideas and summarise the possible undesirable effects into 
three categories. Firstly, there is ‘intended strategic behaviour and gaming’. This includes 
‘window dressing’ where arrangements are made simply to make the school look more 
effective to the inspectorate. It also includes ‘reshaping the test pool’ and deliberate 
‘misinterpretation’, for example with selective data reporting. At its extremes this category 
includes ‘fraud and direct cheating’, for example helping students in examinations or 
changing test scores. The second category is ‘unintended strategic behaviour’ where the 
behaviour of those being assessed is unintentionally changed by the process of inspection. 
Such side effects include ‘formalisation and proceduralisation’ (over-focus on records), 
concentrating on assessed elements ‘and teaching to the test/inspection’ leading to a 
narrowing of the curriculum and ossification (a fear of experimenting with new teaching 
methods). Such ‘tunnel vision and indicator fixation’ can lead to ‘myopia’ where schools 
focus on short-term solutions, rather than long term educational gains. An example of the 
impact of this category is offering easier exam syllabuses or subjects. De Wolf and Janssens 
(ibid) suggest that these unintended effects may lead to ‘convergence and isomorphism’, 
where all school become similar. Finally, the third category is ‘other side effects’ such as 
‘stress’ felt by teachers and principals and good schools ‘resting on their laurels’ (Perryman 
2007).   
 
The research outlined above provides a theoretical framework which suggests that as pressure 
is gradually applied to school systems through inspection, the systems will respond in ways 
that were unforeseen and unintended and that some of these consequences are likely to be 
negative and damaging. This impact will vary across systems depending on the type and 
intensity of the pressure applied but it is theorised that as pressure rises, unintended negative 
consequences will start to appear and will increase in number and intensity.  
 
Empirical evidence on the unintended effects of school inspection and accountability 
De Wolf and Janssens (2007, 382) state that ‘it is widely accepted that control systems have 
side effects’. However remarkably few empirical studies exist regarding the prevalence of 
these side effects in education, and there are large gaps in the literature, both in terms of the 
effects that have been studied and the countries in which they have been studied.  
The majority of the studies in this area focus on intended strategic behaviour, investigating 
the prevalence of window dressing, misrepresentation, fraud and deception and reshaping the 
test pool. The evidence for window dressing primarily comes from studies in England, where 
Brimblecombe et al. 1996; Wilcox and Gray 1996; Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster 
1999; Case et al. 2000 and Chapman 2001 all find evidence that a proportion of schools ‘put 
on a show’ for inspectors. Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster (1999) found that 81% of 
principals surveyed claimed that inspectors did not see the school in its normal state and 
Brimblecombe et al. (1996) found from their survey of teachers that a third suggested that the 
inspector did not see a typical lesson. Ehren (2006) found evidence of misrepresentation in 
Dutch schools where schools included outside playtime in the lesson schedules in order to 
comply with the minimum number of lesson hours. Evidence for fraud and cheating was also 
found. Ehren and Swanborn (2012) found that despite the fact that teachers were being 
observed by inspectors, some form of cheating behaviour/non-compliance with the rules was 
found in more than 5% of schools, ranging from clarifying test questions to prompting 
students with the correct answer. Jacob and Levitt (2003) investigated the prevalence of 
cheating by teachers in Chicago schools by analysing unusual score fluctuations and patterns 
of answers from students. They detected cheating by altering test paper answers in 
approximately 4-5% of classes, which due to the clandestine nature of the acts is likely to be 
an underestimate.  
Many states in the US introduced accountability systems based on student achievement in the 
1990s culminating in the ‘No Child Left Behind’ Act introduced in 2001. The Act requires 
states to judge the performance of schools based on annual test scores, which has led to a 
number of studies in the US focussing on the effects and side effects of performance 
indicators. Most of the studies on side-effects focus on measuring the extent to which schools 
are reshaping their test pool in order to improve their test scores. Jacob (2005), Cullen and 
Reback (2006) and Figlio and Getzler (2006), in Chicago, Texas and Florida respectively, all 
find evidence that since the publication of test scores there has been an increase in the 
reclassification of poorly performing students as having special educational needs. Many of 
these students are then exempt from the tests or from the test results being used to evaluate 
school performance. In contrast, Hanushek and Raymond (2005), in their analysis of national 
US data, concluded that there is no clear evidence of this form of gaming in order to raise 
examination grades. Ehren and Swanborn (2012) found some evidence of reshaping the test 
pool in the Netherlands, but as there were no key differences between high and low 
performing schools it is possible this was due to motives other than the improvement of 
inspection evaluations. 
Very little empirical research exists on unintended strategic behaviour. Sturman (2003) 
studied survey data from primary schools in England and found some evidence on teaching to 
the test. However, Sturman argues that these practices can have beneficial effects as well as 
negative effects leading to score inflation. Klein et al. (2000) and Tymms (2004) both suggest 
that test score rises, in Texas and English schools respectively, were partly due to teaching to 
the test practices. Wiggins and Tymms (2002) use survey data to compare primary schools in 
England (where league tables of examination results are published) with Scotland (where no 
results are published). They found large differences between Scottish and English schools, 
with English schools reporting more concentration on performance targets at the expense of 
other important objectives, a greater ‘narrowing effect’ on the curriculum and a greater focus 
on ‘borderline’ students (those close to the border for national target levels) at the expense of 
other students. Finally, Rosenthal (2004) measured a lowering of examination results in years 
in which schools had undergone inspection and hypothesised that this was due to time and 
energy being taken away from the students and focussed instead on the inspection. 
Agreeing with De Wolf and Janssens (2007) and Penninckx (2016), we can see from this 
summary that there is limited evidence of ‘teaching to inspection’, ‘sub-optimisation’ and 
‘isomorphism’ in the small number of studies which have been conducted in England, the 
United States and the Netherlands. 
 
Profiling accountability systems in participating countries 
An overview of the inspection system and wider accountability system in each country is 
presented below (for further details see Ehren et al. 2013). These descriptions refer to the 
systems as of 2011. There have been more recent changes in a number of countries, for 
example Austria no longer have inspections. 
 
Austria 
Since the early 1990s, Austria has undergone several phases of modernising the governance 
of the school system (Eder and Altrichter 2009). Largely as a consequence of international 
large scale comparative assessment studies, Austria has moved towards output-orientated 
methods and introduced – like many other European countries – an evidence-based 
governance regime (Altrichter and Heinrich 2007). This had led to educational standards, 
regular national assessment of student performance, partially-centralised final exams at the 
end of upper secondary schools, continuous system monitoring and national education reports 
have been established. School inspections, however, have only been introduced in some 
federal states (e.g. Styria) and meanwhile replaced by a “new quality management” for all 
schools on primary and secondary level (Kemethofer and Altrichter 2015). All monitoring 
and accountability measures can be classified as low-stakes since they carry little in the way 
of pressure or sanctions (Specht and Sobanski 2012).   
 
The Czech Republic 
The external control of schools by central inspectorates has a long tradition in the Czech 
lands dating back to the 18th century, with the first centrally organised institution for the 
control of schools being founded in 1759. The current structure and mission of the Czech 
school inspectorate was established in 1995, when the main aim of inspection was reoriented 
towards the evaluation of the school as a whole, rather than the inspection of individual 
teachers, as was the case during the Communist regime. The Czech Republic has no national 
testing (except a final upper-secondary leaving examination introduced in 2011) and 
therefore inspection  represents the main accountability mechanism and external control over 
schools which are, in comparative terms, highly autonomous (Greger and Walterová 2007). 
The main pressure mechanism exerted on schools comes from making inspection reports 
publicly available. In theory the inspectorate has the right to recommend to the ministry of 
education the closure of a school, but in reality this right is not used. Instead the pressure 
comes from the local education authorities that hire and promote school principals and 
influence their remuneration.  
 
England 
An Act of Parliament in England in 1992 made it compulsory for all state funded schools to 
be inspected. The same Act led to the creation of the Office for Standards in Education 
(Ofsted), the organisation responsible for inspections in England. Prior to this, there was a 
long history of inspections and accountability in England, commencing in the 1830s 
(Brighouse 1995). As far back as the 1860s there was a system of ‘payment by results’ where 
schools were given a large portion of their grants based on student performance (Wilcox and 
Gray 1996, 24). Due to this history, some scholars consider England to have ‘one of the 
strongest accountability systems in the English speaking world’ (Southworth 2002, pp192 in 
Barzano 2009). In addition to inspections, compulsory public examinations and published 
school league tables form an integral part of the accountability system in England today. This 
has led to a high-stakes system that puts pressure on schools to do well in order to avoid 
consequences such as the loss of pupils to other schools, extra monitoring inspections or in 
extreme cases school closure. 
 
Ireland 
The evaluation of schools by a centralized inspectorate has been part of Irish educational 
provision since the 19th century. Following the significant breakdown of the system in the 
1990’s (see for example Egan (2007) and McNamara and O’Hara (2008)) there has been a 
substantial refocusing of inspection beginning with the introduction of a cyclical approach to 
inspection called ‘Whole School Evaluation’ (McNamara et al. 2011). A move towards a 
more focused and intensive model then resulted in the introduction of a significantly 
strengthened inspection regime in 2012-2013 (O’Brien et al. 2014). This included the 
continued inspection of individual teachers but added requirements for schools to formally 
conduct self-evaluation and enabled the inspectorate to follow up schools deemed to be 
underperforming. However, whilst there are national examinations, the compilation of school 
league tables is outlawed and there is no system of sanctions or rewards related to either 
school or teacher performance. The publication of inspection reports and the influence and 
perhaps prestige of the inspectorate represent the main elements of pressure to improve in the 
inspection system. 
The Netherlands 
During the last 20 years there has been a trend towards increased school autonomy and local 
decision-making in Dutch educational governance, however, more centralised arrangements 
have been implemented in the area of accountability. One central element of accountability 
measures is performance standards with centralised national testing (Scheerens et al. 2012), 
with the Dutch Inspectorate of Education having increased emphasis on the test and 
assessment results as an indicator of a school’s performance (Béguin and Ehren 2010). A 
risk-based inspection system, including early warning analyses, was introduced in 2007 
(Ehren and Honingh 2011). This makes use of student achievement results on standardised 
tests, self-evaluation and financial reports, parent complaints, and media coverage to decide 
whether a school is labelled as potentially failing and thus whether it will receive an 
inspection (Ehren and Swanborn 2012, 264). This inspection approach increases the pressure 
on the principals and teachers that are evaluated and, as a consequence, can generate strategic 
behaviour on the tests and lead to invalid assumptions when assessing the performance of a 
school (Béguin and Ehren 2010). 
 
Sweden 
After a long period of limited resources for the inspection of schools, a new authority for 
school inspection (the Swedish Schools Inspectorate or SSI) came into being in 2008. The 
Education Act of 2011 gives the inspectorate far-reaching powers. It can implement sanctions 
against municipal schools and withdraw public funding for independent schools that do not 
follow regulations. Since 2010 the SSI has adopted a system of risk-based inspection with 
more thorough inspections for schools judged as being at risk. In addition to regular 
inspection, thematic inspections are undertaken. These focus on particular areas of school 
activities (e.g. leadership) or the teaching of certain subjects. Parents have online access to 
written reports from school inspections as well as data on school performance in national 
tests adding pressure into the system for schools to do well.  
 
Switzerland  
In Switzerland the responsibility for the school system lies with the 26 cantons. Each canton 
has developed a public school system and established school laws. The cantons vary 
according to size and number of schools and governance structures (Huber 2011). 18 out of 
21 German speaking cantons have so far implemented school inspection. The models differ 
on a range of aspects such as the organization, design, procedures, reporting and use of 
evaluation but it is accepted that all of them can be characterised as ‘soft’ as not much 
pressure is experienced by school leaders. At the same time, an emphasis on communication 
with schools and a high degree of transparency are typical across cantons (Huber 2011). 
 The above is a brief summation of very substantial accounts of school evaluation systems in 
the research partner countries. Based on these accounts a typology of the varying inspection 
approaches was developed including the level of pressure experienced by schools as a result 
of inspection. In this typology England and the Netherlands were described as high pressure 
inspection systems, Sweden, Ireland and the Czech Republic had medium pressure systems 
and Switzerland and Austria had the lowest pressure inspection systems. Items were then 
designed for inclusion in the survey to test whether unintended consequences of inspection 
could be identified and if so whether they were connected to the level of pressure applied.   
 
 
Research method 
Samples 
The samples for this project were chosen to maximise the opportunity to make causal claims 
about the impact of school inspection. Randomised control trials were not an option due to 
the legal requirement for inspections in a number of countries. Instead, where possible (in the 
Netherlands and England) a regression discontinuity design (RDD) was used (see Kyriakides 
and Luyten 2009) requiring samples to be chosen from either side of particular thresholds. In 
the remaining countries, samples were chosen for a time series design. Surveys were sent to a 
minimum of 150 primary schools and 170 secondary schools in each country. More were 
sampled in some countries according to response rates and resources.  
 
In England 211 primary schools and 211 secondary schools were chosen that scored closest 
to the satisfactory grade threshold in their main inspection 2009/10. An additional random 
sample was selected in order to assess whether any bias existed due to different sampling 
methods and to increase the number of respondents. This random sample consisted of 1246 
primary schools and 637 secondary schools across all inspection grades from the same year. 
246 schools were common to both samples. In the Netherlands three threshold groups were 
chosen (no risk, risk, high risk) each of which consisted of 100 schools (50 schools in 
primary education, 50 schools in secondary education), adding up to a selection of 300 
schools in total. In order to allow for non-response of schools a targeted sample of 408 
primary schools and 359 secondary schools was selected. In the remaining countries samples 
were chosen for a time series design. In Ireland and Austria (where data was collected from 
the federal state of Styria) all schools were selected for their sample (3200 primary schools 
and 729 secondary schools in Ireland and 503 primary and 194 secondary schools in Austria). 
In Sweden a random sample of 1167 primary and 987 secondary schools was selected and in 
the Czech Republic schools were targeted using the TIMSS design to sample schools (150 
primary and 170 secondary). In Switzerland all primary and secondary (465) schools in 5 
cantons were selected. The cantons were selected according to a typology developed after 
document analysis of school inspection systems in all German speaking cantons in order to 
get a broad spread of school inspection organisations.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 presents the targeted sample sizes for each country and the actual number of 
participants that responded to the surveys, along with their response rates. Response rates 
varied greatly across countries, ranging from just 4% of primary schools in Ireland to 77% of 
secondary schools in Austria.  
 
Survey instrument 
A survey instrument for school principals was developed for the project and included items 
aimed at measuring the unintended effects of school inspections using a 5 point-Likert 
answer scale. Based on the identified categories in the literature of unintended consequences 
of school inspections (Fitz-Gibbon, 1997; De Wolf and Janssens, 2007), we included items 
on the extent to which school inspections lead to a narrowing of curriculum and instructional 
processes in the school (convergence), the extent to which principals experience inspections 
as an administrative burden (formalisation and proceduralisation) and the extent to which 
principals manipulate documents and data they send to the inspectorate (misrepresentation). 
Table 2 gives an overview of the items that were developed. The items did not form a scale, 
leading us to analyse unintended consequences by item. This had the benefit of allowing us to 
provide evidence on the broad variety of unintended effects of school inspection. 
 
Method 
Following a piloting phase the finalised survey was administered to school principals in the 
schools in each of the samples in the seven participating countries. The survey was repeated 
to the same sample three times, in 2011, 2012 and 2013. For this analysis, we have selected 
data from Year 1 of the project.  
 
Descriptive statistics for each item are presented. The data are split by country and the 
countries are ordered by how much pressure the system creates (Altrichter and Kemethofer, 
2014). Observations are made, and linked to interview data/open response data. To 
investigate our research questions, we use a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).  
We report Eta² to describe the amount of variance explained in the dependent variables and 
we use Cohen’s f² as an effect size (Cohen 1988, 477-478).  
 
 
Limitations, threats and mitigation 
We identify the following threats to the validity of our results and we present evidence to 
address these threats. 
  
Risk of bias from sampling 
The study uses two sample styles; some countries use the RDD sample selecting schools 
around a point on a continuum of school quality, others use random samples across all 
schools. To give confidence that the sampling styles are not introducing bias a separate 
random sample was selected in England alongside the RDD sample. T-tests were performed 
to compare the means of this RDD and random sample for all scales in the project. The 
standardised mean differences were small and there were no statistically significant 
differences between the two samples for any of the scales. This gives us confidence that, 
where it can be tested, the different sampling does not appear to be introducing significant 
bias in the results. 
 
Risk of bias from low response rates 
Table 1 shows that there were low response rates in a number of countries so we must be 
cautious claiming any findings are representative. However we can strengthen our claims if 
we can show that the schools that responded are significantly different to schools that did 
respond. We have therefore, where possible,  compared schools that responded with those 
that did not. Using national datasets (primary and secondary) in England (where data is more 
readily available compared to other countries in the study), schools responding to the survey 
were compared with those that did not on a number of characteristics (achievement in 
national examinations, value-added/progress measure in English and mathematics, a measure 
of socio-economic status, inspection ratings, proportion of students with special educational 
needs and proportion of unauthorized absences). The standardized mean differences were 
small with no statistically significant differences for either primary or secondary schools. In 
Austria there were high response rates and the schools in the sample do not differ 
significantly from the total population with reference to school type and size. Reasonable 
response rates were achieved in the Czech Republic and Sweden, and good regional coverage 
across the country and representation of schools with different size/student intakes was 
confirmed in the Czech Republic and good representation of school types in Sweden.   
 
Risk of bias from missing data 
Table 2 presents the number of principals that completed the unintended consequences items. 
Fewer respondents completed items directly related to inspection because not all schools in 
the time series design received an inspection in Year 1 of the study and in those schools that 
had received an inspection, not all staff were present during the inspection. The second 
column in Table 2 presents data on the number of respondents that were given items on 
inspection and column three presents the number of principals that answered all five of the 
unintended consequences items. The last column presents missing data for these items, which 
we can see ranges from 0 to 10%, which is considered small in terms of missing data, and 
should therefore limit any bias. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Risk of bias from item wording and interpretation 
There may be issues in interpreting our results, particularly across countries, due to issues of 
interpretation and translation. Firstly, differences may have been introduced when the surveys 
were translated from English into Dutch, Swedish, Czech and German. The items that were 
translated into Dutch from English were back-translated into English. The back translation 
matches the original English, giving us some confidence that meaning was not lost in 
translation. Similarly the Austrian and Swiss research teams cooperated to ensure a high 
quality of translation using back translation. Secondly, items may be interpreted differently 
by different people, within a country and across countries. We minimised this issue by 
interviewing convenience samples in each country during the pilot stage to check 
respondents’ understanding of items. Although the wording of items is a little clunky in 
places there was a common understanding of items both within countries and across 
countries.  
 
Risk of bias from principals not responding honestly  
This risk particularly applies to items that could be perceived to reveal negative behaviour 
(although the issue was not raised as a concern in the piloting phase). A separate part of the 
study collected data from teachers in England and the Netherlands and item 1 (see Table 3) 
was common to both surveys. The principals responded to whether or not they discourage 
teachers to experiment with new teaching methods that do not fit the scoring rubric of the 
inspectorate and teachers were asked whether or not my principal discourages me to 
experiment with new teaching methods that do not fit the inspection criteria of the 
inspectorate. If the principals were not answering honestly then we would expect to see a 
marked difference between the responses of the principals and teachers. However when 
principals and teachers were matched by school 80% of the responses matched within +/-1 
Likert response, giving some evidence that in general principals are answering honestly. 
 
 
Survey Results  
From Table 2 we can see that across the seven countries, 1122 school principals replied to all 
items referring to unintended consequences. Table 3 presents the mean and standard 
deviation for each item. Figure 1 presents these results on charts with 95% confidence 
intervals. The countries are ordered according to how much pressure the inspection system 
creates, with the most highly pressurised system first.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) shows significant differences in unintended 
consequences across countries, with significant differences between countries being found 
with respect to every item (see MANOVA results below each chart in Figure 1). The ratio of 
variance explained by country varies between 4 % (presenting a positive picture) and 19% 
(narrowing curriculum) among the five items. According to Cohen (1988), f²-values of 0.02 
represent a small effect, values of 0.15 represent a medium effect and values of 0.35 represent 
a large effect. We can see from Figure 1 that all but item 4 show medium sized effects. A 
Tukey-test was used to identify which countries differ on a level of p ≤ .05. Even when 
taking the 95% confidence intervals into account, there is a clear gap between many of the 
means of the countries, which shows that the countries differ in their prevalence of 
unintended consequences. We now go on to describe these differences. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 indicates that the clearest patterns can be seen for items 2 and 3. The results from 
item 2 show an association between increasing pressure in a school inspection system (in 
terms of pressure to do well in an inspection) and an increase in the narrowing of the 
curriculum and instructional strategies in the school. Similarly, item 3 shows that as the 
inspection systems increase in pressure there is an associated increase in principals claiming 
that school inspections have resulted in a refocussing of the curriculum and instructional 
strategies. Table 3 shows that in the high pressure systems of England and the Netherlands 
approximately 50% of the principals believe that inspection is resulting in a narrowing and 
refocussing of the curriculum and instructional strategies, whereas in low pressure systems 
like Switzerland and Austria this proportion is 10% or lower.  
 
Based on the literature we would expect to see principals discouraging teachers from 
experimenting with new teaching methods that do not fit the scoring rubric of the 
inspectorate. The results from item 1 in Figure 1 show that the majority of principals claim 
they do not discourage teachers in this way and the level of pressure of the inspectorate does 
not appear to be related to their responses. However Table 3 shows that although it is not the 
norm to discourage teachers from experimenting there are a large number of principals who 
admit to this behaviour. In fact, on average across the countries surveyed one in ten principals 
attempt to curb their teachers’ teaching practices to remain in line with what is perceived to 
be the inspectorate’s preferences. Between 4% and 34% of principals answered positively to 
the item across the countries. 
 
Similarly the literature would lead us to expect that inspections would lead a number of 
principals to misrepresent their school in the data sent to the inspectorate in order to make 
their schools look better. The results for item 4 showed the majority of schools do not claim 
to be painting a more positive picture of their school than actually exists in the data presented 
to school inspectorates. However, Table 3 shows that on average across the countries 7% of 
principals admit to presenting the school in a more positive light, i.e. misrepresenting their 
school to the inspectorate. This is particularly high in the Netherlands, England and Ireland 
where one in ten or more principals are admitting to misrepresenting their data to the 
inspectorate. Although this practice was not the norm, a result of 7% is high for such 
undesirable behaviour. By comparing means there seems to be no association between these 
proportions and how much pressure the inspection system creates, however it is noticeable 
that three of the four highest pressurised systems have the highest proportions of principals 
responding positively to misrepresent data.  
 
Principals responded more strongly to item 5, with between 37% and 84% agreeing that the 
preparation for inspections is mainly about putting protocols and procedures in writing and 
gathering documents and data. The negative aspects of this are illustrated by an open 
response comment from a principal in England: 
 
“Data drives everything and appears to be 90% of the inspection process, ignoring 
the wider holistic role of school.” 
[School Principal, England] 
 
The results for item 5 do not show any association with pressure, with the medium 
pressurised systems of the Czech Republic and Sweden showing the greatest prevalence. This 
finding for the Czech Republic probably reflects the mainaim of inspection in that country 
which is to ensure that the schools comply with formal regulations and legislation. Inspection 
in that country is therefore compliance rather than improvement-driven. 
 
 
Discussion and summary 
This project has given us a rare opportunity to empirically study some of the unintended 
outcomes of school inspection in a systematic way, analysing various consequences across a 
number of different countries. In all research we need to be cautious in our claims due to the 
threats to the validity of our results. However we have tested potential threats and bias in 
number of possible ways and have found no clear bias, giving us increased confidence in our 
findings. Findings from the survey showed varying prevalence of each unintended effect and 
varying association with pressure and it is clear that in some key areas there is a significant 
link between inspection pressure and negative unintended consequences.  
 
Most clearly and most importantly, the results showed a clear association between increasing 
pressure in a school inspection system and an increase in the narrowing of the curriculum and 
instructional strategies in the school. Similarly, as the inspection systems increase in pressure 
there is an associated increase in principals claiming that school inspections have resulted in a 
refocussing of the curriculum and instructional strategies. In an era when the development of 
skills and attributes including creativity, problem-solving, self-directed learning and 
flexibility are considered vital educational outcomes this must be of serious concern.   
 
Other indications of negative consequences of inspection also related to high pressure 
systems are less prevalent and yet very concerning. These include discouragement of 
experimenting with new teaching methods and the misrepresentation of the school in the data 
sent to the inspectorate. Even small numbers admitting to these actions is undesirable. Again, 
as with narrowing the curriculum, limiting teaching methods and teacher autonomy may also 
impact on the achievement of key educational objectives.  
 
We found that some unintended consequences do not seem to be linked to the amount of 
pressure an inspection system creates. The reason for this is unclear. For example the 
prevalence of formalisation and proceduralisation is evident across all countries studied and 
is also a matter of concern. It is probable that coping with the demands of inspection systems 
places a heavy burden on school management and teachers and results in a great deal of time 
being spent on record-keeping, form-filling and related activity regardless of whether the 
inspection system is high-stakes or not. This burden, moreover, is likely to increase as most 
inspection systems now require schools to engage in systematic self-evaluation as part of 
accountability procedures.  
 
This study has shown that pressure is associated with some unintended effects of school 
inspection, but did not find evidence that it is linked with others. Whilst the association does 
not establish causation, the findings are consistent with increased pressure producing 
unintended and negative consequences. This corresponds to previous empirical work, to Le 
Chatelier’s principle and Campbell’s Law (1976) and to the predictions of key writers such as 
Smith (1995) and Fitz-Gibbon (1997).  
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Table 1: Sample sizes and response rates for Year 1 data collection 
 
  
Primary Secondary Combined 
Netherlands 408 359 73 (18%) 15 (4%) 88
England* 1422 637 189 (13%) 101 (16%) 290
Sweden 1167 987 567 (49%) 464 (47%) 1031
Ireland 3200 729 123 (4%) 42 (6%) 165
Austria (Styria) 503 194 345 (68%) 149 (77%) 494
Czech republic 150 170 56 (37%) 69 (41%) 125
Switzerland 132
Total 2325
Country
Targeted Sample Actual sample - Year 1 (response rate in brackets)
* Combined RDD and random samples
        Primary         Secondary
132
Table 2: Respondent numbers for unintended consequences items and missing data 
 
 
  
Countries
Respondents 
inspected/asked 
items 1-5
Number 
completed 
all 5 items
Percentage 
missing 1 or 
more items
Netherlands 47 45 4%
England* 238 229 4%
Sweden 362 343 5%
Ireland 128 114 9%
Austria (Styria) 320 288 10%
Czech republic 43 43 0%
Switzerland 65 60 8%
Total 1203 1122
* Combined RDD and random samples
Table 3: Unintended consequences items and scales with descriptive statistics for combined 
Y1 and Y2 data 
 
 
 
Item Responses Country
Number 
of 
schools
Mean SD
% Positive 
response 
("4" or "5")
England 235 2.15 0.93 9
1 = strongly disagree Netherlands 46 2.50 0.94 15
2 = disagree Sweden 354 2.62 0.87 12
3 = neither agree or disagree Ireland 123 1.63 0.94 4
4 = agree Czech Republic 43 2.32 1.01 7
5 = strongly agree Switzerland 61 2.93 1.17 34
Austria 302 1.91 0.79 4
All countries 1164 2.22 0.95 10
England 238 3.08 1.25 40
1 = strongly disagree Netherlands 46 3.22 1.20 51
2 = disagree Sweden 353 2.29 0.01 9
3 = neither agree or disagree Ireland 122 2.01 1.25 12
4 = agree Czech Republic 43 1.67 0.89 19
5 = strongly agree Switzerland 61 1.75 0.91 5
Austria 299 1.87 0.76 2
All countries 1162 2.36 1.11 15
England 238 3.53 1.06 60
1 = strongly disagree Netherlands 46 3.61 1.06 65
2 = disagree Sweden 353 2.89 1.07 32
3 = neither agree or disagree Ireland 123 2.89 1.21 34
4 = agree Czech Republic 43 2.12 1.03 7
5 = strongly agree Switzerland 61 2.03 1.06 10
Austria 300 2.40 0.89 10
All countries 1164 2.92 1.13 31
England 232 2.06 0.02 10
1 = strongly disagree Netherlands 46 2.02 1.13 15
2 = disagree Sweden 350 1.93 0.77 2
3 = neither agree or disagree Ireland 122 2.23 1.18 14
4 = agree Czech Republic 43 1.58 0.85 2
5 = strongly agree Switzerland 60 2.35 1.09 8
Austria 292 2.23 0.88 7
All countries 1145 2.08 0.93 7
England 232 3.12 1.24 46
1 = strongly disagree Netherlands 46 3.35 1.18 52
2 = disagree Sweden 352 3.93 0.78 79
3 = neither agree or disagree Ireland 126 2.94 1.33 37
4 = agree Czech Republic 43 4.14 0.83 84
5 = strongly agree Switzerland 60 3.65 1.15 70
Austria 295 3.26 1.00 46
All countries 1154 3.46 1.11 58
5. Preparation for school 
inspection is mainly about 
putting protocols and 
procedures in writing that are 
in place in the school and 
gathering documents and data
 1. I discourage teachers to 
experiment with new teaching 
methods that do not fit the 
scoring rubric of the 
Inspectorate
 2.School inspections have 
resulted in narrowing 
curriculum and instructional 
strategies in my school
 3. School inspections have 
resulted in refocusing 
curriculum and teaching and 
learning strategies in my 
school
4. The latest documents/facts 
and figures we sent to the 
Inspectorate present a more 
positive picture of the quality 
of our school then how we are 
really doing
Figure 1: Charts showing responses to items, split by country and ordered by decreasing pressure  
 
Y
Difference between countries is sig. at p<0.01, Eta2=0.16, f2=0.18 (MANOVA) Difference between countries is sig. at p<0.01, Eta2=0.19, f2=0.24 (MANOVA) Difference between countries is sig. at p<0.01, Eta2=0.17, f2=0.19 (MANOVA)
5 = Strongly agree
4 = Agree
3 = Neither agree or disagree
2 = Disagree
1 = Strongly disagree
Difference between countries is sig. at p<0.01, Eta2=0.04, f2=0.03 (MANOVA) Difference between countries is sig. at p<0.01, Eta2=0.13, f2=0.14 (MANOVA)
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1. I discourage teachers to experiment with new 
teaching methods that do not fit the scoring 
rubric of the Inspectorate
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2. School inspections have resulted in narrowing 
curriculum and instructional strategies in my 
school
1
2
3
4
5
M
ea
n
 w
it
h
 9
5%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 in
te
rv
al
s
3. School inspections have resulted in refocusing 
curriculum and teaching and learning strategies 
in my school
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4. The latest documents/facts and figures we sent 
to the Inspectorate present a more positive 
picture of the quality of our school then how we 
are really doing
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5. Preparation for school inspection is mainly 
about putting protocols and procedures in 
writing that are in place in the school and 
gathering documents and data.
 
